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Geographies of Absence: Radicalization and the Shaping of the New
Syrian Territoriality
Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj
Common Space Initiative
In November 2015, the United States and the Russian Federation convened the main international
stakeholders engaged in the Syrian conflict to broker the Vienna Accords. The unfolding political
process culminated in the issuing of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Since then the situation
has evolved rapidly, ushering in a new outlook for the resolution of the six-year-old civil war. The
conflicting parties in Syria have not yet fathomed the momentum of this deal. Some progress has
been made as part of successive attempts to establish a “cessation of hostilities,” but there have
not yet been any major breakthroughs because the negotiating parties, supported by regional
allies, are resisting the process every step of the way. The war has created new geographic
realities: governance structures, political economies, and cultural paradigms. These geographies
will not be easily bypassed. Dealing with the fragmented situation will hinder the prospects of a
top-down solution, particularly because none of the negotiating parties has full control over its
constituency. This article focuses on understanding this new geography. Arguing that the
emergence of radicalized actors on the scene is not an accidental feature of the conflict dynamics,
it shows how, instead, the territorial patterns of control by the different actors have used and
exploited the territory to advance their positioning. Subsequently the article argues that these
patterns, intended or not, have fostered the radicalization of the armed actors on all sides,
imposing in the meantime asymmetrical patterns of territoriality that will seriously undermine the
top-down approach of the Geneva process.
______________________________________________________________________________

The conflict in Syria has exposed the fragility of the territorial order of the nation-state in the Near
East. The civil war raging in the country for the past six years has evolved new patterns of
territorial control used by the different actors to assert their position. While most international
observers have focused on territorial acquisition as the main paradigm for assessing the relative
strength and weakness of the different parties (and subsequently on their readiness to engage in
the political process), this article focuses on different techniques for controlling the terrain, or what
it calls territoriality. It also looks at spatial economies of control and the symbolic and etymological
instruments used to legitimize action. In this regard, it examines the consequences of spatial action
by both local and international actors (including the humanitarian actors).

Omar Abdulaziz Hallaj is a consultant on urban planning, development, and local governance. He is a senior
coordinator of the Syria Project at the Common Space Initiative in Beirut, where he is engaged in facilitating various
dialogues and research projects for peace building and recovery planning in Syria. Formerly, he was the CEO of the
Syria Trust for Development and served on the boards of several nongovernmental organizations and public
commissions. His professional and research work relates institutional, financial, and political frameworks to the
production of built environment. In 2007, he was the recipient of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture as team leader
of the Shibam Urban Development Project (GIZ). He subsequently served on the master jury and the steering
committee of the award.
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This article, however, is not about the Syrian armed conflict per se. That subject has been
covered by numerous other studies.1 Instead, it charts how the Syrian territory was constructed
over the years after the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. It then examines how that territorial
order was progressively dismantled during the ongoing war, enabling the emergence of new forms
of territoriality serving mainly the radical and radicalized actors. The article proposes three parallel
processes of deterritorialization. First it looks at how the terrain was fragmented through the
dissolving of governance institutions, then how the political economy of aid contributed to the
dismantling of local resilience, and finally how a new symbolic order of radicalization was
imposed on the terrain. Rather than presuming to indict any one set of actions or claim to know
the intentions of individual actors, it examines the different spatial strategies used by all actors to
put forward the proposition that the collective impact of their actions has created ample ground to
foster radicalization. Armed actors as well as humanitarian and civil actors have contributed to the
emergence of a new political economy that exploits the terrain. The article concludes with
recommendations that would steer interventions in Syria toward building a more sustainable peace
based on concrete social and economic foundations rather than on the abstract liberal peacebuilding model advocated in the Vienna agreement and codified through UN Security Council
Resolution 2254 (SC Res. 2254).

Introductory Note
The political boundaries of the Near East evolved progressively in the nineteenth century at a time
when the Ottoman Empire was falling behind as a world power. Western colonial enterprises had
set their eyes on dividing the remnants of the “sick man’s” territories. This was also a time when
the West was grappling with its own global order and the balance of power among the largest
power houses in Europe. Political theory was struggling between expansionist visions and the need
to avoid further wars in Europe.2 The notion of territorial demarcations among states, which
hitherto had been only nominally a matter of concern for the European monarchs, became part and
parcel of the idea of the nation-state. Delimitation and demarcation of national territories became
a dominant pillar of the emerging order in the post-Napoleonic era. Nations invested heavily in
reinventing themselves within clear national borders. But territories were not to be taken for
granted. Various power strategies and techniques for reinforcing the state had to be instilled at all
levels.3 The UN charter of 1945 further reinforced the idea that to avoid further war and ensure the
stability of the world order national territorial integrity must be respected.4 Today we take national
territories for granted because myriad international bodies and cultural and sports events are
organized to reinforce the imagined communities bounded by an artificial boundary under the
banner of the nation-state.5
While national territorial boundaries have had a wide range of instruments (international as
well as national) to reinforce them and normalize their presence, other forms of territoriality did
not simply vanish. On one hand, colonial powers moved away from territorial expansion to
exercising their hegemony through internationally sanctioned civilizational missions (the post–
World War I mandates), transterritorial instruments (defense treaties of the 1950s and 1960s), and
progressively since the second half of the twentieth century, economic and knowledge monopolies.
On the other hand, we have seen the emergence of new global networks dominated by nonstate
actors. These networks encompass transnational corporate entities and global resistance
movements. The increasingly globalizing world enabled and empowered by the opening of the
World Wide Web have allowed for new forms of territorialities to emerge: supranational as well
as subnational. Along with these new forms of territoriality, new identities emerged, requiring new
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instruments to mitigate the contestation that these identities have unleashed against the national
territorial order.6
Yet, it is premature to talk of the end of the nation-state. Stakeholders that have for over a
century reinforced their positions by manipulating the political economy of the nation-states are
not ready to give up. The volume of international flows, magnificent as it is, has not been able to
accumulate in the hands of bodies and institutions that can challenge the political and economic
interests aggregated on the national level. The sacred alliance that began to emerge between
subnational and supranational actors fostered under the banner of the multilevel governance is
facing major challenges.7 Whether the current trend of rejecting the European project (e.g., Brexit)
and the recent reversion of voters to right-wing nationalistic politics is a last stand against
globalization or a return to nineteenth-century global world politics only time will tell. What is
clear, however, is that a great deal of the modern-day violence and warfare is no longer taking
place across national frontiers but along the fracture lines within the nation-state. In the Near East
these wars have also been greatly influenced by the emergence of regional nonstate actors working
vehemently to redraw the map.8
State actors in the Near East have often supported terror groups against each other to exert
political pressure. Today, however, within a rapidly globalizing world order, both state and
nonstate actors are sponsoring different brands of radicalized networks as a way to create
conditions conducive to the advancement of their interests.9 These interests range from geostrategic positioning to creating new demands for anti-terror instruments and measures. Yet, terror
does not manifest itself only as an externally driven phenomenon; terror networks have developed
independent strategies that exploit the differences of interests between state and nonstate actors.
Rupture points are occurring across internationally recognized political borders, where years of
purposeful neglect and compromise with radical ideologies provide ideal conditions for terror
networks to recruit and operate.10 Different generations of terror groups have moved their focus
from infiltrating fragile states to destabilizing entire regions. In doing so they have played on
multiple spatial strategies that undermine national territorial systems and foster new forms of
territoriality.

A Brief History of the Syrian Territorial Order
The Syrian territory is as artificial as any in the world. To understand how it has become fractured
today, one must start by looking at how it was constructed through various state-building and
territorial-demarcation strategies. A hundred years ago British and French negotiators sat down
together to demarcate the post-Ottoman territory into zones of influence in what became known as
the Sykes–Picot Agreement. That infamous 1916 agreement, however, was neither the first nor the
defining moment of the emerging national territory of Syria. It was one part of a long political
process that culminated in the creation of an independent state in 1946.
From the onset, “Syria” as a nomenclature was a colonial reinvention of a vast territory in the
eastern Mediterranean that had for centuries been divided into administrative subdivisions of the
Ottoman Empire, none of which was known by the name Syria. The name, however, does appear
frequently on French and other European maps from the late Middle Ages into the nineteenth
century. These maps often used a biblical toponymy to designate lands that have for centuries been
called by other names. The French colonial pundits began speaking of the Syrian question in 1858
when sectarian tensions in the region culminated in pogroms against the Christians in Mount
Lebanon and many other cities of the interior. The Syria in question consisted of the coastal strip
and some of the larger urban centers just east of the coastal mountain range. The hinterland was
3
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not relevant to the civilizational mission of the French colonial enterprise or its trade. Defending
the Christians of the Levant corresponded perfectly well with the need to draw further trade
concessions from the Ottoman sultans.11
The clear colonial ambitions of the West alarmed the subsequent Ottoman sultans, beginning
in the early years of the nineteenth century. The challenge of splintering their territories (with
Western support) necessitated a strengthening of the social contract with their heterogeneous
subjects through a process of reforms known as the tanzimat. Local governance and representation
in a pan-Ottoman assembly created chances for a new and invigorated Ottoman identity among
local elites.12 But the Ottoman attempts to reaggregate their terrain did not satisfy the many
aspiring nationalist voices from the Levant. Political repression of these aspirations failed to stem
these growing voices; rather, it helped gradually to sway public opinion in their favor. Yet these
proto-nationalistic aspirations were not linked to a specific territory as much as to a grander panArab movement. The 1913 conference held in Paris by students and delegates from the different
countries of the Levant and Egypt was a milestone in defining a need for secession from the
Ottoman Empire but a far cry from defining what would replace it.13 For all their intellectual and
emotional vigor, these emerging voices failed to create grass-roots political and social structures
to amass organizational support for the idea of a new state.14 The Ottoman administration and
social control remained firmly engrained until the eve of World War I.
The Ottoman administrative subdivisions featured very little in the colonial discourses on
Syria and were irrelevant to the demarcation lines that eventually were used to create the nationstates of the Near East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. When the two negotiators, the British
Mark Sykes and the French François Georges-Picot, signed their famous map they focused very
little on the type of governance that would emerge once these territories were no longer part of the
Ottoman Empire. The British favored some form of local self-rule (since they had been negotiating
with the sherif of Mecca to be the ruler of an emerging Arab state under British protection), while
the French cared only for direct control of the coastal area. Various options could have been
acceptable for the governance of the region, including small semi-independent states under the
nominal umbrella of a reformed Ottoman khalifat, independent states under the protection of the
British and French colonial administrations or as full colonies.15 What mattered most in that deal
was establishing a testing ground for a realpolitik policy of intertwining French and British
interests to prevent further military competition between the two superpowers.16 The French would
get 25 percent of the oil, concessions (including archaeological digs), and expert commissions in
the British zone of influence, and the British would get reciprocal concessions in the French zone.
The first modern political map marking the birth of Syria was thus not a territorial map but a
map of colonial territoriality. The subsequent maps that emerged in the wake of World War I
delineated that territory progressively as the colonial powers narrowed down their options for
future governance in the region. The treaties of Versailles, Sevres, Lausanne, San Remo, and
Ankara were further steps toward the final delineation of the territory, a process that took several
years of negotiation between the French and the British on one side and the French and the Turks
on the other. The process of delineation, however, was not immediately matched by a parallel
process of demarcation on the ground. That process was defined by several factors: (a) the British
campaign to subdue the Iraqi tribes from 1918 to 1921, (b) the battle of liberation led by Kemal
Ataturk to push the French back and recapture territory that was supposed to remain with Turkey
after the signing of the armistice, (c) the preference of the French to allow the majority Christian
enclave of Lebanon to become an independent state in its own right and to merge several of
Damascus’s traditional agricultural hinterland to that nascent state, and (d) the subduing of the
4
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Kurdish national aspirations in the northeastern part of what became Syria (what the Kurds still
define as Roj-Ava or Western Kurdistan). The final borders of Syria bear little resemblance to the
lines drawn earlier by the Sykes–Picot Agreement. The core of the Syrian state that was eventually
bestowed with a territory of some 185,000 square kilometers and put under the civilizing mission
of the French mandate was defined by a coastal strip and the main hinterland cities lying behind
the coastal region; the rest of the territory required a lot of work to be incorporated in the Syrian
national imagination.
The artificial borders imposed on that territory cut off all traditional trade routes and supply
lines (Aleppo to Mosul and Damascus to Beirut and the Lebanon) and ruptured tribal lands (Horan
with Northern Jordan, Deir Zor with western Iraq, and the Alawi and Kurdish ties to southern
Turkey). The state that emerged in the post-Ottoman period was not a nation but a mosaic that
comprised multiple fragments that left almost every component of its citizenry yearning for a
missing part of its identity.17 Those with strong Arab affiliation aspired to a greater Arab
nationhood, those still clinging to their Muslim identity reminisced about the greater Muslim
khilafat, and the Kurds and Armenians wondered why they were cheated in the grander mapmaking exercise of the region. Faysal bin al-Housain, the Hashemite prince brought from Mecca
to become the ruler of this new state, expected to rule a much wider terrain. He saw the French in
the coastal region to the west and the British in Iraq as interim forces and waited to be handed the
reins of the whole Levant and Iraq in keeping with his father’s communication with the British
during the war, while the French saw him simply as the local ruler who would manage the selfadministration of the interior cities of Syria.18 The clash of expectations plagued the development
of the Syrian nation for years and defined the core political issues in the country. Many of the
efforts to consolidate the territory were fraught with misunderstandings of that initial founding
moment.
Various short-lived interim local governance arrangements were put together during the
mayhem that resulted when the Ottoman armies surrendered to the French and British forces in
the Levant.19 Faysal eventually established his presence in Damascus, but his control over the rest
of the terrain remained nominal and based mainly on the undefined expectations that some national
entity would soon be formed. In 1920 delegates from different regions gathered for an ad hoc
meeting in Damascus to draw up the new state’s constitution. The delegates had no clear mandate
that defined their responsibilities or their power of representation.20 Ideologues would try for years
to guess what the actual conditions were that brought these delegates together and to define the
collective national identity that formed the basis of their congress.21 The only concrete outcome of
that meeting was a federal constitution that proclaimed a constitutional monarchy and defined a
proportional system of representation (to ensure that minorities were not overtaken by majorities).
The state to be governed by this new constitution had no defined borders and the districts that were
supposed to make up the national body still had not been demarcated.22 The nascent government
lived but a few days, until the French forces led by General Henri Gouraud moved east from Beirut
to capture Damascus and proclaim the French mandate.
The French subverted the federal constitution of Syria by delineating five small states that
poorly reflected the real ethnic and sectarian diversity of the country and attempted to create
imagined sectarian enclaves where the local traditional elites would be clients of the mandate
authority.23 The terms of the Lausanne treaty clearly handed the French the responsibility of
overseeing the creation of a new nation called Syria, but several years of negotiation and intrigue
would be required before the territorial organization of that Syria would take shape.
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The French needed to homogenize their colonial administrations and reduce the cost of
managing their vast colonial territories. That goal was achieved in part by fostering loyalty to the
French administration among the local governments, which helped to subdue political unrest, and
in part by adopting a highly complex set of urban and land management regulations that were
designed to provide a normative rationalist standard to facilitate territorial control.24 The
regulations included laws to administer the demarcation and delineation of private property (laws
188 and 189 of 1926). The French authorities also issued laws to regulate state public lands (law
144 of 1925) and state private property (law 275 of 1926) and other laws to further normalize the
different types of traditional land tenure systems into a single framework of private property. The
Ottomans had attempted to normalize the land management system starting with the 1858 land
reform law, but they failed to develop a homogenized bureaucracy to administer the system, and
great local variations prevailed across the Ottoman lands.25 The French administration deployed a
process of air photography combined with land triangulations to establish the basis of the land
cadasters constituting the backbone of the land registry still in place today. This point is important
to remember because one of the principle strategies of the deterritorialization strategies adopted
by radical forces in Syria has been to dismantle this land management system.
Effectively, the French normative administration created the territorial management tools that
would eventually enable the unification of the territory and the bringing together of the different
fragments into a single political body. Territorial normalization, however, was not restricted to
land management. Regulating such matters as hygiene, schooling, tax collection, transportation,
and management of antiquities contributed to the creation of a homogenized terrain. One can
follow the logic set by Benedict Anderson26 that, despite the attempt at creating a political narrative
for a sectarian Syria, the normative administration created a de facto imagined community out of
a territory that had no recognized border and lacked a historical raison d’être and whose primary
traditional local identities were disrupted by artificial borders.
The national elite soon capitalized on the new bureaucracy to redevelop alternative ways of
asserting their economic power, while the new state created a local market for their nascent
agribusiness, textiles and, most important, new urban services. Indeed, the elites needed a singular
market to compensate for their lost economic networks, because traditional trade and supply
patterns were disrupted by artificial state borders. The need to create a singular market coincided
with the need to forge a definitive national identity for the emerging state. The national consensus
to accept the new national boundaries and drop previous aspirations for alternative identities (panArab and pan-Islamic) emerged slowly, though it was often challenged by small ideological drives
for alternative modes of imagining the state (Kurdish nationalism, communism and greater Syria).
The success of the national bourgeoisie in 1930 to extract a concession from the French mandatory
authorities to establish a new constitution based on a central parliamentary political system did not
go unchallenged and required many concessions by the elite political parties to ensure continued
French rule in Syria.27 The elite relied in part on the economic crisis of 1929 to mobilize the
masses.28 The sectarian federal system crumbled because of the alignment of nationalist aspirations
with dire economic needs to overcome the trade barriers between its components. The dividing
lines that were left behind, however, were never managed in the nationalist discourse.
The nationalist movement that continued the struggle for independence swept sectarian and
ethnic differences under the rug and made any talk of such identities taboo. The emergence of the
independent Syrian state after 1946 was enshrined in a discourse of national identity intertwined
with a moralizing language of propriety and public order. Ironically, the French normative system
of governance enabled the creation of a homogenized territorial administration that eventually
6
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overthrew the French mandate. The emerging elite used the normative power of the state to gain a
moral high-ground for the pro-Syrian narrative. Yet, in reality, the new state lacked the necessary
institutional depth to administer the territory. The ideals of the elite notwithstanding, the only
viable institution to actually provide law and order in the country was the army. Thus, contrary to
some nostalgic sentiments among many Syrians about the golden years of democracy in the
immediate postindependence era, the reality of the matter is that Syrians were charmed by the
ability of the army to provide order, while the political elite were quibbling about their interests
and ideals.29 The army intervened on various occasions to impose order. Syria was plagued by one
coup after another for years; some were internally driven while others reflected the interests of
foreign powers in aligning Syria to their grander regional schemes.
Through the succession of civilian and military governments in Damascus, the political and
military elite clung to the nationalist discourse of a unified Syria as a form of a political
compromise. The nationalist discourse provided a political ideal against which the various political
actors would justify their power. But that ideal was hindered by the limited capacity of the state to
manage its territory effectively and to construct the infrastructure for the creation of a unified
national narrative. Thus, the nationalist ideal was constantly challenged. Years after independence
in 1946, sectarian and ethnic grievances continued to take subverted forms. The national state had
to face the challenges of small, esoteric cults like the Murshidiyeh (an offshoot of Alawi sect), the
Greater Syria movement led by Antoun Saadeh, the diverse Kurdish formulas ranging from coexistence with to independence from the central government, the Muslim Brotherhood
compromise to work within the confines of the national order while extending links to the wider
international network of the Brotherhood, communists striving for a universal “International,” and
most important, pan-Arabs enchanted by Egypt’s Gamal Abdulnasser’s charisma as the foremost
embodiment of the pan-Arab “corps-politique.” This enchantment led to a short-lived unification
experiment with Egypt that was driven by the inability of the Syrian state to meet its financial
obligations as much as the bankruptcy of the Syrian nationalist discourse. Yet, the centralizing
administrative system of the United Arab Republic (particularly that of its security system) soon
forced most political actors in Syria to reconsider their position. Even the most ardent pan-Arab
party, the Baath, was involved in setting up the secession from the United Arab Republic in 1961.
But the Baath did more than contribute to the secession. In 1963 it organized the March 8 coup
that secured its handle on power ever after.
To understand how the Baath ensured control over Syria, one has to understand how it
structured the territory and developed a multilayered governance system that creates vertical
systems of control supported by horizontal systems of patronage and clientelism across the whole
Syrian terrain. Syria had always lacked the internal elements of economic sustainability that would
allow it to impose itself as a strong player on the regional level. Among these were the instruments
to extract revenues from its territory and transfer these resources into a sustainable nation-building
project. The Baath, in contrast, was able to put in place a mechanism for extracting national wealth
and differing economic problems. It certainly used the heavy hand of the state and its security
devices to quell dissent and impose its symbolic and ideological hegemony.30 But among the most
important instruments of control it created was a political economy of patronage.31
What the Baath managed to do, however, goes one step deeper. It created centralized
administrative channels that extracted national resources and collected them into the hands of the
state, allowing Syria for the first time to amass sufficient resources to impose a universal geometry
of territorial control. The system allowed each urban area to feed off the riches of its rural
hinterland while appeasing the rural constituencies through patronage and state employment.
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Urban riches were in turn usurped by the central cities, and Damascus usurped the riches of the
whole system through centralized revenue extraction instruments. Administrative control,
however, worked in exactly the opposite manner, from the top down. The national budget provided
allocations for state bureaucracy at each level of governance that could be redistributed through a
complex horizontal web of clientelism. Such a system would soon have collapsed if it were not for
the critical, regular recalibration of power. In essence, while the Baath professed to revolutionize
Syria and to impose a socialist homogenizing order, on the ground it worked through traditional
systems of loyalties (through coercion or bribery).
The governance system was designed in such a way that its three branches of power (the state
bureaucracy; the Baath Party; and the security agencies, which include four main agencies and a
dozen other specialized ones) competed with and complemented each other. Each branch was
centralized within its own internal reporting structure, though locally each branch fostered its own
horizontal set of loyalties. Thus, it was not unusual to see a governor aligning himself with a
specific head of the security agencies and some of the larger urban bureaucrats, while the Baath
Party chief may have aligned himself with other security heads and other urban bureaucrats. The
mayor of the largest city may have been part of yet another network, and so on. Each of these
networks then fostered horizontal loyalties to traditional local elites. These networks acted to offset
each other and to ensure that no local power could be aggregated against the central state. State
favors and access to bureaucratic resources were spread horizontally to a very wide range of local
clients. Each local patron-client network covered part of the traditional elites and ensured the
loyalty and that of their constituencies to the system. The system was calibrated regularly through
the transfer of personnel from one province to another. It created a pyramidal system of deferring
entitlements and slowing down the pace of expectations for succession within the system, a proven
technique in mitigating authoritarian control.32 On the national level, the system fostered similar
complex webs of patronage among top bureaucrats, party leaders, and security chiefs with top
business leaders.33 The net result was a system that depended on very rigid vertical administrative
hierarchies and very flexible horizontal patronage networks both on the national and the local level.
Local elites competed also for national and local elections. While everyone knows that elected
bodies had very little real power in Syria, they still represented an important symbolic positioning.
A single electoral district based on simple majorities allowed coalitions fostered by the Baath to
win parliamentary and local elections. While elections were often hindered by the indirect
interference of the Baath and the security agencies in the determination of who was allowed to run
and who was not, the election law secured the Baath’s majority in any governance body and
ensured that independents could never form a reasonable block to counterbalance the Baath. The
Baath’s electoral tickets were unified through internal elections before the national ones.
Independents had to compete in a wide pool of candidates. Their coalitions had to contend with
dividing the remaining votes. In effect, only people loyal to the system could get in as independents
tagged in on the Baath’s ticket. Here again the informal patronage networks interfered to ensure
that local elites from the different patronage networks were voted into these not-so-effective but
rather prestigious bodies, a phenomenon that is not restricted to Syria but is endemic in local
governance in the whole region.34
The complex intertwining of power structures had clear territorial implications. The
concentration of populations, economic resources, and services in cities led to the rapid rural-tourban migration that characterized most of the 1970s and 1980s and showed no signs of slowing
down till the late 1990s.35 The two main cities of Damascus and Aleppo together accumulated the
bulk of the local gross domestic product, causing a major discrepancy between cities and their
8
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hinterlands and among different regions. Government spending per capita varied drastically among
the different regions of Syria and clearly created some cause for concern as the national planning
authorities scurried to offset the structural biases in the distribution of resources.36 The central
extraction system coupled with a redistribution based on political clientelism failed to calibrate
itself.
The system produced areas in the country where the private economy dominated the local
GDP and other areas where state budgets were more dominant, in essence, where a rentier
economy based on political patronage was in place. State budgets were divided relatively equally
among major and minor provinces but very inequitably with respect to populations and needs (see
Fig. 1).37 Homogenizing state bureaucracy meant that big provinces were treated similarly to small
ones. Cities were classified on the basis of their ranking within the system and not on the basis of
their population; therefore a town such as Douma in rural Damascus was a secondary city though
its population superseded that of primary cities such as Tartous and Daraa. The local governance
system was endowed with a minimal bureaucracy and therefore with few independent budgets and,
most important, a limited capacity to provide jobs within its skeletal administration. This
discrepancy between the homogenized bureaucracy and the heterogeneity of the territory meant
that large parts of Syria were controlled by informal economies, because the nominal state budgets
and minimal bureaucracy could not keep up with population growth and increased demand.

9000
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4000
3000
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Percapita budget in Syrian pounds

Total budget in thousands of Syrian pounds

Figure 1. Total and per capita distribution of the independent provincial budgets in
Syrian pounds in 2010 (internal memo by the Ministry of Local Administration and the
Central Bureau of Statistics in Syria, 2011)
Another failure of the system came as a result of surplus labor. The state embarked on a series
of land reforms that created a cap on agricultural properties. This cap was one of the main
instruments the Baath used to buy the loyalties of the rural population. Agricultural cooperatives
were set up in almost every village and their funding continued to increase even when state
spending on social services and subsidies was shrunk as part of the economic reforms adopted by
the state after Bashar al-Asssad ascended to power as president in 2000.38 Yet two generations of
demographic growth and inheritance fragmented agricultural lands further and further, making
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agricultural production very costly. The state embarked on a plan to subsidize basic grain
production under the guise of food security, buying wheat and other cereals at above-market prices.
But this measure did not prevent massive labor surpluses. Most of the redundant labor was
absorbed in informal-sector jobs on the periphery of the big cities. Yet a substantial part of the
surplus labor, along with a surplus of academic graduates,39 went to the Gulf states, creating
another form of territoriality in Syria. Migrants brought back with them alternative ideologies and
images of different forms of territoriality. While migration enabled the Syrian state to defer the
question of labor redundancy and draw on expatriate remittances,40 it caused a serious threat to the
Baath’s formal ideology.
The Baath propagated a national narrative of the Syrian state as a temporary step toward Arab
unity. The judiciary system ruled not in the name of the Syrian people but in the name of the Arab
people in Syria. The school system promoted this pan-Arab narrative, and most publicly sponsored
cultural programs talked about Arab culture as opposed to Syrian culture. Yet, the state
administration and bureaucracy coupled with the informal patronage power relations betrayed that
narrative and fostered micro-scale identities. Syria lacked a coherent national narrative that
correlated with its territorial boundaries, and it fostered an inconsistent system of territorial
governance that professed a normative homogeneity while depending on a highly unsymmetrical
pattern of political patronage. Ethnic and sectarian groups had no formal rights and no major
advantages or grave disadvantages in the system, yet the Baathist state was preoccupied with
managing local identities as it coerced local elites within its sphere of influence. Those who obliged
were duly compensated and those who resisted were severely punished, including some of the
conservative urban Sunni Muslims in Hama and Aleppo in 1982 and the Kurds in 2004. The
governance system, with all its contradictions, was kept in balance by the Baath Party’s complex
strategy for distributing state favors and resources broadly.

Spatial Techniques of Radicalization
This territorial reality was the backdrop for the 2011 uprising. The uprising started with different
groups bringing their grievances against the state, though these manifestations had no strong
ideological or political agenda. The tide of the Arab Spring was still fresh and many young people,
enthralled by the example set by other Arab countries, sought to follow. But rather than delving
into how the uprising started or examining all the theories about the root causes for the rebellion,
this article focuses on the types of territoriality that emerged during the past six years. To that
extent, however, it does not divide those six years into the three distinct phases—pacifist, early
militarization, and radicalization—that several researchers have proposed.41 Such periodization
does not help to explain how the geography has evolved. Instead this article looks at the different
processes of fragmentation of the territory and the trajectory of each one of them with respect to
the others.
When the Syrian protesters took to the streets in early 2011, their chants included a slogan
that translates roughly as, “The Syrian people are one.” This phrase proposes certain assumptions
that until now have not been fully analyzed: that Syrians view their country as a unified territorial
unit; that the state operates the same way throughout Syria, thus enabling an uncritical narrative to
emerge that this was a revolution of a people against a regime; and that the Syrians have a unified
vision of how they want to live together in the future. The experience of the past six years has
shown this last assumption to be the farthest from reality. Furthermore, the signifier “Syria” has
multiple interpretations. It is a contested field that cannot be taken for granted. Yet Syrian
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stakeholders have raised it to such a symbolic level to avoid answering critical questions about the
social and political dynamics that actually shape the conflict. The main theory of change driving
the Arab Spring revolutions was regime change. In other words, the narratives of change have
focused on a unified, centrally controlled territorial body that requires no more than replacing the
center to improve. Peace-building efforts in Syria have also focused on the simplistic notion that
a liberal peace can be established that will appease everyone and create change from the center
out. The Geneva Communiqué, the Vienna accord, and SC Res. 2254 all make this assumption.
Yet because the conflict grew beyond the national borders and evolved into a full-fledged proxy
war, it is important to re-evaluate the assumptions underlying the simplistic narratives that framed
the Syrian conflict.
The approach shall be to look at three parallel processes of territorial transformation. These
processes are neither complementary nor exclusive of each other. Their combined effect is a
progressive opening of the territory to radicalization. Answering the critical questions about peace
building and deradicalization depend to a great extent not on the central process of political
transformation in Damascus but on how these territorial transformations can be reversed, each on
its own terms.
Deterritorialization: Erasing Borders and Obliterating Institutions
The first manifestations that took place in different Syrian cities and towns were small, and,
considering the ferocity of the Syrian security apparatus, they seemed to defy logic. The
demonstrators could not trust any form of political or social organization to unify their voices, so
they relied on small local networks of trust. Thus, solidarity could be secured only at that micro
level.42 To effect expansion from one region to another, the demonstrators developed crude, basic
organizational structures drawn from models propagated by social media and the formal broadcast
media.43 The Baath’s complex network of vertical hegemony and horizontal patronage meant that
any attempt to create obvious territorial outreach was doomed to failure. Yet that did not stop some
shy initiatives to cross-fertilize local action through minor exchanges of know-how and resources.
Most of these cross-territorial transfers were carried out through small personal efforts that often
relied on informal social relationships (kin, city of origin, friendships) and were not on the level
of political organizing. If anything, political structures were assumed to be often infiltrated by the
Baath’s complex antennas of social control.
That early mode of action grew into a basic geometry of social organizing. Small solidarity
networks evolved into local coordination committees (LCCs). Since there was no clear standard
by which to organize and aggregate their work, the LCCs created informal ways of consolidating
their political messages through virtual voting for the slogans of the major demonstrations
organized every Friday after the Friday prayers, in what became known as the Friday slogans.44
But LCCs operated differently. Some were open to participation by women, while others
developed around very conservative and traditional values, which called for excluding women
from the public sphere.45 In some parts of the country, the LCCs grew more tolerant of
militarization, while in other parts they remained basically civilian. Also, within a span of less than
two years most LCCs developed different degrees of religious overtones. Many were later
transformed into local administration councils (LACs).46
The LACs developed along different models of governance. And it took about two years
before some normative level of administration became acceptable. At first more than a thousand
LACs were identified because many neighborhoods and small villages developed ad hoc
committees to oversee local services. Eventually many were consolidated into more viable units,
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and now roughly four hundred councils with varying technical and financial capacities operate in
the rebel-held areas.47 Money donated to support the provision of services brought with it certain
externalities. Among these was the development of divergent models of local governance
following the international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were providing the funds.
The Local Administration Councils Unit (LACU) set up in Gaziantep, Turkey, which was loosely
affiliated with the opposition-led Syrian Interim Government, decided in 2014 to adopt a slightly
modified version of the law for local administration issued in Damascus in 2011. Despite
differences in the level of military control, gradual homogenization of the standards of local
governance occurred across the opposition areas. Some armed groups in some regions (Aleppo
and Dara’a) allowed LACs in their areas to formally affiliate with the provincial councils led by
the exiled Syrian Interim Government, while others, especially in areas controlled by hard-line
Islamist groups, such as Nusra Front, Ahrar, and Jaysh al-Islam, tolerated only a technical
exchange between the local councils and the LACU.
What did not vary, however, was the basic geometry. The local organizational structures
remained aterritorial and did not evolve upward into provincial or national bodies. With rare
exceptions that occurred late in the game (Eastern Ghouta in rural Damascus and more recently
the western part of the Aleppo Province), bottom-up territorial governance structures were unheard
of, if not downright resisted by donors and politicians alike. Eastern Ghouta towns had to develop
collective governance for their services because the whole region was put under siege by the
central government and the different towns had no choice but to consolidate their resources to
create an economy of scale to survive. Western Aleppo Province was aggregated only to reduce
the burden of support provided by Nour al-Din Zenghi brigades, the one armed group that controls
the region. The military command needed to rationalize its subsidy to civilian bodies. It is an
exceptional small enclave where only one armed group has a more or less unified control over a
territory. In all other instances, the terrain remains contested among the armed groups (more on
that later).48
The opposition that would be favored by international bodies to represent the voices of dissent
in Syria evolved through different iterations. The effort focused on forming a national body that
would challenge the authority of Damascus. The Syrian National Council, then the Syrian
Coalition of Oppositional and Revolutionary Forces, the Syrian Interim Government, and most
lately the Higher Negotiation Council were all set up as national structures without recourse to the
grassroots for legitimization. To ensure the survival of communities, local bodies had to develop
their own processes of legitimization. Yet there was no formal or informal way to legitimize the
national oppositional structures. The terrain that was to be conquered from the central government
through military action evolved into a territory only in the narratives of the revolutionaries but not
through concrete social and political action. The terrain became known as the liberated areas, but
beyond the fact that the central government is no longer enforcing its rules and regulations there,
there has been little effort to consolidate the territory.49
The strong link between the Baath and the state institutions created a natural reaction among
the rebels. State institutions became synonymous with the Baath regime. While a minority of
socially conscious activists tried to protect these institutions (some desperate efforts were made to
preserve court, civic, and cadastral records), the momentum of the uprising was to dismantle them
and improvise alternatives to governance.50 The idea of “liberating the terrain” inadvertently
created an undue burden on the opposition forces to provide services to their constituencies and to
take on the charge of protecting these services. In many instances, attempts were made to persuade
state employees to stay put and run the nascent alternative institutions. But because the
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management of the public service was so much a part of the Baath’s patronage system, most
administrators, fearing for their lives, abandoned the opposition-held territory, leaving behind only
rank-and-file local employees.51 Thus, not only did the territorial divide create areas of
asymmetrical devastation and damage from military operations, it created asymmetrical capacities
to administer the territory.
The makeup of the armed groups that took to resisting the central government followed the
same pattern at first. Brigades came together in small numbers to defend towns and neighborhoods.
Though some used standard military terminology (battalions, brigades, divisions, etc.) to describe
themselves, these units had no uniform definition and no homogeneity of command and control
protocols. A brigade or a division could be large or small; it could shrink and expand in response
to the availability of funding. Alliances were created under a variety of pretexts, some ideological,
others based purely on who was funding at the time.52 While local units were solidly tied to their
home turf, the larger alliances were not concerned about specific terrain. They were interested only
in consolidating access to local resources, such as oil, local tithes, and border-crossing points.53
The logic of territorial control for larger alliances was less about turf than it was about asserting
their relative presence in the battlefield.54 In many instances, when the larger alliances, which felt
no location attachment, were squeezed for resources or were forced on the battlefield to relinquish
some areas under their control, they soon relocated to other areas to continue their work, leaving
local fighters to fend for themselves. The larger alliances realized early on that they must stake
their reputation on their ability to win battles, not to hold territory. Thus, each alliance would
normally send a few brigades to fight in the bigger battles around Syria, because the fighting was
driven by a desire to respond to the call for jihad and an interest in sharing in the loot of military
munitions.55 The concept of loot often merged with early Islamic principles for dividing the spoils
of war.
The larger rebel alliances created an overlapping territory, with each alliance staking a share
in the different terrains rather than trying to forge a single turf for itself. Naturally this practice led
to squabbles over resources. To resolve the emerging conflicts, the armed groups needed some
form of arbitration. Lacking any viable judiciary authority, they resorted to establishing arbitration
courts and designating trusted arbiters to run these courts. The most trusted authorities were local
clerics and the courts were soon dubbed “the religious authorities.” The author’s mapping of some
of the early formations of the religious authorities in the province of Aleppo reveals that particular
armed groups tended to aggregate around specific authorities. The authorities were not location
specific as much as they were stakeholder specific.56 While the hardening of the fight and
ideological and funding realities were instrumental in the radicalization of the rebels, the pattern
of aggregation should not be underestimated in this regard.57
The armed groups tried to delegate a larger governance role to the religious authorities. But
in many cities and towns parallel governance bodies emerged, often competing for legitimacy and
resources.58 On one hand were the governance structures that evolved organically from the LCCs
to become LACs, as described earlier, and on the other hand were the religious authorities. The
separation of duties and jurisdiction among the typologies of local governance is still not resolved
in most areas, though there is a tendency to gradually stratify the roles, allocating to the civilian
bodies the responsibility of providing services, while keeping the policing and the courts in the
hands of the religious authorities. A tacit understanding is gradually emerging whereby the armed
groups are acknowledging the ability of civilians to attract western donor funds to support the
provision of services and encouraging them to do so. In that regard the small funds provided by
the Syrian Interim Government and the nominal coordination between the LACs and the provincial
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governorate councils that work closely with the Syrian Interim Government are tolerated. But the
religious authorities jealously guard the courts and the adjudication of justice.
The insistence on the courts has a complex rationale. As discussed later, most radical religious
opinions tend to demarcate the fine line between the Abode of Islam and the Abode of War in
terms of the institution of the court and not that of the prince. Therefore, to attract funds from
radical nonstate actors, one must clearly demonstrate that one is running the courts. Ironically,
once the ownership of the courts was securely in the hands of the religious authorities, they found
themselves the recipients of substantial USAID funds aimed at strengthening law and order and
providing stability, perhaps as a counterweight to the draw of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
to Islamic-leaning fighters.59 Territorially, however, the effect of this allocation of funds is that the
governance of basic civilian services in the opposition-held areas is run according to an
administrative hierarchy (state, provincial government) while other aspects related to policing and
justices are run on the basis of intraregional military alliances. Local service provision through the
LACs is thus fragmented to the lowest common denominator of satisfying immediate local
resources without the possibility of linking service providers and creating economies of scale.60
While the war and the pressure by the central government can be blamed for much of the failure
to establish viable governance bodies in the opposition-held areas, the competing modes of
territoriality (supported by competing donor interest) seem to have had the upper hand in setting
up the opposition to fail to create homogenous territoriality. In the quagmire, radical groups have
found fertile ground to exploit the situation and ISIS has emerged as a better manager of local
governance (more on that later).
In a different direction, the experiment of the Kurds in the north and northeast of the country
is an exception. The central government abandoned Kurdish majoritarian areas just as they
abandoned many other areas in Syria. The Kurds, however, negotiated a status quo that allowed
state institutions to continue to run despite the growing political divide. The coalition led by the
Democratic Union Party (PYD) in conjunction with local tribal and sectarian entities created areas
of self-rule on a political level and not an administrative level. Basic service provision was left in
the hands of state institutions.61 The Kurds had to pay a political price for such a deal, with many
in the opposition thinking of them as allies to the central government, when in reality they managed
to avoid carrying the burden of administration alone.
The Kurdish-dominated self-administration zones have created a dual system of governance.
One part is concerned with services left to the local institutions (no attempt at reinventing the
wheel here), the other with political governance, which is determined by the practical need to
protect the terrain from intrusions, especially from radical Islamic groups (first by Nusra Front and
then by ISIS). Through coercion of traditional local forces or mutual fear of external intruders, the
different components of the community were brought together to create the political pact known
as the Social Contract of Roj-Ava. The preamble to the Charter of the Social Contract defines the
constituents of the “Democratic Autonomous Regions” as “Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans,
Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens,” not as citizens, and the full text defines a powersharing deal between the most powerful and well-organized Kurdish faction (the PYD) and the
other components that lack strong organizational capacities. In essence, it further reinforces
traditional local elites in their local role without allowing local actors the ability to consolidate
their political impact on a broader territorial level.62 Only the PYD has the power to exercise such
territorial control in the autonomous self-administration areas.
Regardless of the morality and legality of such a political pact, the model advocated in these
zones constitutes another model of territoriality that should be carefully examined because it will
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pose yet another challenge to the consolidation of the national territory in a postconflict period.
For now, however, this additional model of local administration is only creating further asymmetry
of governance and contributing to the fragmentation of the territory at the most basic level, which
will make resolving the conflict from the top down along the liberal peace-building model
proposed by SC Res. 2254 even more complicated.
The central government did not at first seem to be bothered by losing a certain part of the
terrain as long as it could maintain its hegemony over the territory. The central government
territoriality was maintained by exercising three levels of control: national, provincial, and local.
On the national level, as long as the Security Council was deadlocked on Syria, the central
government was assured that it could always depend on the international order to maintain its
borders and did not need to invest in protecting those borders itself. Thus, the central government
abandoned most border crossings without any serious resistance and, in doing so, shifted the
burden of protecting the borders to the regional and international arena while maintaining the
sovereign right to exercise control over the border when it suited Damascus. The UN bodies must,
as part of their mandate, coordinate with the state parties. The Syrian case was a first-time
challenge. Syria could not be put under the Chapter Seven provision of the UN Charter (i.e.,
placing the responsibility of governance in Syria in the hands of the UN) without bypassing the
Russian veto. Thus, the central government maintained full control over the presence of the UN
on the Syrian territory (retained the territoriality without investing in controlling the territory).
Furthermore, only government-issued formal identification and other administrative documents
would be acceptable internationally. All attempts by the International Friends of Syria to create a
legitimate alternative to the government of Damascus remained nothing more than symbolic
gestures with little legal value.
On the provincial level, the Syrian government abandoned many positions in rural areas,
knowing well that the rural areas lacked the ability to administer themselves without the larger
cities.63 While it is not entirely true that the uprising in Syria is a rebellion of the countryside, the
central government promoted that narrative to reinforce the schism. Narratives of the urban/rural
divide created an important rallying point for the government in Damascus. The effect of these
narratives is only now being observed by the international media,64 but they were an essential part
of how the central government consolidated its power over cities. The central government also
ensured from the beginning that the cities under its control would remain open to internally
displaced people (IDPs) leaving devastated war zones under opposition control. Today, various
estimates put the remaining Syrian population at about seventeen million inhabitants, down by
about six million who left the country altogether.65 While there are no formal statistics, it is
estimated that cities have become home to more than two-thirds and perhaps as much as threequarters of the remaining population. Urban areas have become the harbingers of stability in the
country and the majority of these cities lie in the hands of the central government. Most maps of
the Syrian conflict use color to demarcate the terrains controlled by the different belligerents.66 On
those maps, the government appears to be losing terrain. But had the mapmakers looked at the
growth and shrinkage of populations, had they looked at the accumulation of local GDP, or had
they followed the volume of expenditure on public services, the picture would look completely
different. Again, the central government abandoned territories but retained a high level of
territoriality.
On the local level, the government created emergency measures to consolidate local
governance and delegate responsibilities to the local governors to make decisions. While at the
beginning of the conflict the government seemed interested in moving reforms toward
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decentralization by issuing law number 107 late in 2011, the law was hardly implemented. In
theory, it redesigned the geometry of the Syrian territory to enable the state to move to a high level
of decentralization within five years. Abandoning the previous emphasis on the governorates (the
provincial governments) and their subdivisions (districts and subdistricts), the new law elevated
the role of municipalities and defined a very broad base of authorities and responsibilities to the
elected councils of the cities, towns, and townships. The governorate councils would become
coordinating bodies among municipalities and not one hierarchical oversight body as they were
previously envisioned.
The Ministry of Local Administration then issued ordinance 1378 in 2011 to demarcate the
new administrative boundaries of the new municipalities. The decision created 1,341
administrative units divided into 157 cities, 502 towns, and 682 townships. The ratio of cities to
towns and townships differed greatly from one province to the next because of variations in the
number of cities. But the aggregation of Syria’s more than 6,000 smaller villages into townships
had an altogether different rationale behind it. Each township was to be endowed with future
budgets of its own, allowing the state to spread its patronage even deeper into the local community
of the rural countryside. Lattakiya Province (population of slightly less than 1 million inhabitants)
had 4 cities, 30 towns, and 64 townships, while Aleppo Province (population close to 5 million)
had 24 cities, 111 towns, and only 20 townships. Clearly, in the loyalist province of Lattakiya, the
rural community was the backbone of support to the Baath. In Aleppo Province only the urban
areas were perceived as solidly progovernment and rural areas were already being suspected of
going rogue. Local elections were held on December 12, 2011. About 43,000 candidates competed
for 17,629 seats, a very low ratio even by Syrian standards. About 15 percent of the councils could
not be filled, and a great many others did not have enough candidates to fill the local seats.67 Even
by that early stage, the government in Damascus was being detached from the local level.
Yet, beyond creating the new administrative units and setting up the local elections in 2011,
the government did not move ahead with the implementation of the law. The powers of the local
municipalities remained seriously curtailed by the intervention of the provincial governors and the
governorate security committees. The shrinking of the buying power of the Syrian pound and the
diversion of the state budget to support the war effort meant that investment budgets on the local
level were almost eliminated and municipalities were reduced to the minimal role of solid-waste
management and sewer maintenance. Any larger expenditure required budgets that only the
governors could move. In effect, rather than decentralization, the situation created the opposite
trend of concentration of power at the provincial level.
But while the central government could still exercise relatively strong territorial control at the
level of the governorates, it found it necessary to decentralize its local military control. Private
militias were set up to aid the government in critical military operations, and recently the
government has even increased its reliance on foreign forces. Retaining the flexibility to move
across the territory and between different front lines to match the flexible maneuvering of the rebel
groups necessitated outsourcing the local law-and-order operations. Local militias were
encouraged to arm themselves to defend and protect their neighborhoods. In areas where the
sensitivities of local minorities were high, young men could choose to serve in these local militias,
known as Popular Committees, rather than be recruited into the army. The Popular Committees
were then organized under the National Defense Forces to give them some control, though they
remain very local in their composition and loyalty.68
These militias often set up their own checkpoints around their neighborhoods, creating
physical barriers between the different zones of larger metropolitan areas or conurbations.
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Different security branches were also encouraged to set up checkpoints to control critical local
junctions in cities and towns. Such actions, however, took them beyond their formal mandates and
fragmented the terrain even further, reducing economic flows and subjecting the cities and towns
to tithes and illegal duties. Also, inadvertently, these checkpoints created a sort of barrier against
the flow of civic-based activities that concentrated and justified communitarian-based solidarity.
These checkpoints created a negative form of social capital based on local leadership and reduced
the ability of civilians to move across the territory. In that regard their social impact is similar to
the effect of the local armed brigades that control opposition areas, reducing the civilian and civic
capacity to flow through the territory and aggregate territorial fluxes in the hands of the armed
actors.69
The net effect of the different types of emerging territoriality is an asymmetrical geometry
that differs from one part of the country to the next. Each political stakeholder has its power
situated in and dependent on a different type of territoriality (see Fig. 2). This asymmetry will
constitute the first challenge for the peace process because the interests and power of each of the
actors are clearly situated at different ends of the scale. But at a more fundamental level this section
has shown how the fragmentation of the territory goes beyond the skirmish lines separating the
warring factions. It affects the ability of civilian actors to move across the territory and
monopolizes the territorial control in the hands of the armed actors even within each area of
control. Moreover, it fosters negative models of social capital based on communitarian solidarity.
Radicalization must therefore be mapped at this fundamental social transformation as a result of
the breakdown of the territory, and in that sense it is not specific to any one group. All social
groups started hardening their positions as their ability to move across the terrain was reduced.
This is the first strain of radicalization that needs to be observed.

Figure 2. Viability of governance institutions

Aid Networks and the Political Economy of War
Much has been written about the war economy and how it is fueling the conflict in Syria.70 This
article examines only the spatial implications of that economy and the impact it has had on the
increased radicalization in the country. The focus is on the spatial patterns and the types of flows
involved. In that regard, the flow of international aid, often looked at in purely humanitarian terms,
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affects economic and power patterns and gets entangled in the political economy of the war on
many levels.71
The humanitarian aid to Syria has been a contested issue since the first days of the conflict.
The UN was deadlocked in the Security Council over what to do in Syria. Without a clear political
mandate, the UN organizations could operate at only the most basic level: humanitarianism. As
early as the first days of 2011, many UN programs were brought to a quick halt or were allowed
to die out without extension. The only focus for the new programming was the delivery of
humanitarian aid; development aid ceased altogether and was not brought back in earnest until
2016 under the guise of supporting livelihoods. European contributions to UN programming was
earmarked for humanitarian needs. The European Union, which took an early stance against the
human right records of the central government, put forward no aid beyond serving the immediate
needs of displaced communities. Even the early programming of the European Union that was
geared for direct spending through such programs as Tahdir and Madad focused on humanitarian
issues.72
While humanitarian aid had a major role in saving lives, it had two externalities. It fostered a
climate of dependency and entitlement because viable local production was sidestepped to deliver
aid more efficiently, leaving behind a great number of people unserved and dependent on radical
networks to support them. It also fostered localism by empowering the more radical actors to shape
the local political economy and take charge of the flow of aid between the different locations. This
section explores these two externalities and attempts to map their spatial impact.
The first wave of IDPs and refugees was small, but everyone wanted to show that they were
ready to take them in. Early IDPs were housed in collective shelters and provided with
complimentary services; the standards set for these early shelters created a certain bar that was
impossible to replicate once large numbers of IDPs started to flow. Today, it is estimated that IDPs
make up more than a third of the Syrian population still living in Syria.73 Yet, the proportion of
funding going to help the IDPs find jobs remains miniscule compared with the amount of
humanitarian aid delivered.74 The problem with humanitarian aid is that it is never enough. The
UN’s own assessment of people in need (PIN) varies considerably from one organization to the
next. The UN organizations operating in different sectors (water, shelter, food, etc.) have not
managed to put together a convincing combined index for need. The Humanitarian Need Outlook
reports issued every year must contend with suboptimal definitions of “need.” Often the solution
is to take the largest number of PIN in any sector in any given subdistrict to be the PIN number in
that area. In that regard PIN numbers for Syria lose granularity and accuracy when considered for
area-based planning and are only relatively more accurate when considered for sectoral planning.75
Despite these shortcomings, the UN estimated that in 2016 more than 13.5 million people were in
need of aid in Syria.76 Until then, the combined volume of funds to keep people alive in Syria had
never been clearly articulated. Planning for the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) was input
based and not impact based. But even at 2 USD per person per day (the figure needed to keep
people above abject poverty), the bill would amount to about 10 billion USD a year. And if we
add just the larger donors’ published figures we are not likely to get a total larger than a third of
the actual need. The question to be raised now is, who gets served and who does not? Earlier, the
important question, how do we leverage aid to serve everyone by helping a peace economy to
emerge and employ people again? was never seriously asked, at least not in formal published
policy papers.
When recipients consider aid an entitlement, there is always the question, who deserves it and
where does it actually get spent? There is also an endless flow of allegations of corruption and
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favoritism.77 The UN was obligated under its charter, and lacking a clear mandate by the Security
Council to do otherwise, to coordinate its aid with the central government. That meant that all
employment in UN agencies, the procurement of aid material and delivery trucks, and so on all
took place from the territories controlled by the central government. Once the Security Council
authorized cross-border delivery, some flows went in, mainly from Turkey to the north. But, in
contrast to peace-time delivery, a large part of humanitarian budgets go to cover the cost of
logistics. Thus, indirectly, the delivery of humanitarian aid empowered certain actors, mainly in
the government areas. These actors include the administrative staff of the UN, urban-based NGOs
with access to the terrain, and the providers of logistics (delivery trucks, security, etc.). To avoid
perceptions of favoritism and to improve economies of scale, procurement was done in bulk
outside the areas in need or outside Syria altogether. The products delivered then competed with
local production and often drove local producers to close down their businesses.78 Moreover, since
aid was not calibrated with local needs, many of the products that were delivered as aid were
redundant and resold at below market prices, further competing with local production.
Those who did not get access to aid still felt entitled to it. When LAC administrators and local
NGO volunteers working on aid delivery in different parts of the country were asked in interviews
with the author about their ability to raise local contributions to cover the cost of services in their
community, the initial response was that the people are too poor and cannot contribute. But when
pressed further about why it is that in other poor countries people do contribute in kind, the answer
was always along the line of, “Our people expect that our deliveries to be free because they know
that aid money is responsible for covering their needs, and if we ask them to contribute they will
accuse us of stealing the aid money.”79 A circle of dependency has been created. Radicalized actors
exploit the situation by (a) delivering minimal products but spread to a wider constituency of
recipients to demonstrate a more equitable norm for the distribution, (b) involving the community
in delivery and creating local structures of patronage in the process, and (c) extracting communal
contributions under the guise of religiously mandated taxes (alms and tithes). These practices are
not new and have been observed in Gaza and other places.80
ISIS in particular understood the power of levying taxes under Islamic pretexts. While the
amounts raised were not enough to cover its tremendous war machine and sizable administration,
ISIS affirmed the hegemony of its brand of state and provided people with a slightly above-average
service when compared with what was happening in other parts of non-government-controlled
Syria.81 Moreover, the taxes were meant to encourage merchants to bring in trade and exchange
goods freely in their areas. ISIS areas were governed with an iron fist but with very clear
governance standards. If a merchant paid his dues, he was free to conduct his trade. This practice
allowed a great deal of economic flows to go through ISIS territory (not just oil) and to be traded
within their different provinces. But, more important, its ability to provide for an “Islamic” model
of territorial governance allowed it access to international nonstate-actor funds.82 Radical funding
to ISIS was concentrated in the hands of the central financial structures of the Islamic State.83
Those structures ensured that other service providers, be they international organizations or the
remaining bureaucracy of the central government in Damascus, work under their own control to
legitimize their patronage.
Spatially, international aid delivery has created three observable patterns. The first pattern is
that the areas controlled by the central government were given priority in the delivery of aid, and
as a result, they have been favored by the secondary effect (the hiring of staff, procurement of
goods, and hiring of delivery services). The second pattern is the emergence of certain new
locations and towns as nodes where exchanges take place between the different geographies. At
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these nodes, armed actors and, increasingly, the radicalized actors from all sides have taken control
over the transfer of goods and collected local tithes to finance the war economy.84 By increasing
the apparent risk for these transactions, the most ardent fighters have been able to increase profits
at these nodes and ensure that they are the better party to mitigate these risks.85 The third pattern
is the breakdown of intercity trade and its replacement with cross-border deliveries from Turkey
and Jordan or cross-line deliveries from Damascus, which have had the effect of creating
dependency on the outside. Again this last observation has to be correlated with the emptying of
the territorial dimension from civilian action and limiting territorial actors to the hardened armed
groups.
The second externality of humanitarian aid was its fostering of local political economies.
Some of the largest aid programs that went beyond the humanitarian level to work on empowering
local government and delivering services in opposition-held areas focused on promoting stability
through good governance.86 Strengthening the delivery of services was seen as a countermeasure
to ISIS’s and other radical groups’ increased attractiveness to local communities. Yet, in meetings
with a large number of administrators who worked on the delivery of European- and US-based
programs in Syria, this author heard repeated expressions of doubt about the validity of the theory
that work on local stabilization and good governance can reduce radicalization. Much of the work
that was done to empower LACs seems to have had no sustainable impact.87 More important,
because funding and resources were so limited, these efforts failed to counteract radicalization. To
understand the reasons for this failure, it is important to look at how aid was delivered.
In many parts of the country no longer controlled by the central government, aid groups often
supplemented their service-delivery programs with capacity-building programs for local councils.
Almost all major donors provided resources to support LACs. Most of these programs focused on
empowering local civilian actors, most were not directly related to governance on a normative
level, and most offered standardized packages of services and did not involve the community in
designing localized solutions. This last point may be questioned by some donor programs because
they worked specifically on establishing local committees to assess needs and develop solutions.88
But a close examination of the workflows reveals that the focus was on solving individual
problems rather than looking at the full picture and the surrounding conditions that affect the
problem. Thus, the resolution of an issue such as a water shortage might not go beyond fulfilling
the immediate humanitarian need by providing water. Related issues, such as the sustainability of
the water source, the availability of gasoline to pump the water (the gasoline was often purchased
from ISIS areas), the recycling of the water, and the economies of scale involved in serving
multiple communities through one project were not typically addressed in the donor beneficiary
talks.89
Setting up infrastructure that would serve multiple communities was a complex undertaking.
It raised the issue of the ownership of the service and the lack of governance bodies that could
operate and maintain it. More important, a wide set of armed actors had to agree to guarantee the
safety of the new infrastructure. Negotiating such an agreement required some local actors to defer
to other local actors and seek compromises with them. The easiest and most expedient way to
deliver supplies and implement programs was to act locally where the set of actors was limited
and manageable. In each locality a religious authority coordinated the interests of the local armed
groups. These religious authorities often responded to the standards set by the most powerful of
the local armed actors, who tended to be the more radical groups on the scene. The religious
authorities exercised a strong say in the selection of the local councils. What is often presented as
an election process of the local councils is not the type of election that western democracies are
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used to. Instead, the “electoral operation” in most places resembles a consultative process to select
a general assembly of elders that eventually will elect the council.90 In opposition areas very few
councils actually hold real elections, though the phenomenon is more common in the Kurdishdominated self-administration zones. In return, the local councils and the armed groups tend to
favor certain local NGOs and community-based organizations with their partnerships; these are
often kin-based relationships or are based on local patron-client relationships where local elites
exercise a high level of influence on the local council.
Funds in the hands of armed groups made up most of the resources any given community
received. These funds were often provided by nonstate actors who supported the armed groups for
their hardline religious jihadist stances. The armed groups contribute to the welfare of the
community by providing military and police protection.91 They also contribute a portion of their
own funding to the LACs as a way of legitimizing their operation and consolidating their power.
Many of the local councils indicated that they depended on the armed actors to cover as much as
70 percent of their budgets. Thus, the donor funds, important as they are to cover investment and
installation costs for infrastructure, provide a small fraction of the funds needed for the general
maintenance and operation costs of infrastructure projects. In other words, donor funds are
introduced into a closed patronage network dominated by the armed actors, particularly the more
powerful radical groups. Despite efforts by the donors to brand their work as civilian and
humanitarian, it was delivered through structures that the recipient communities see as part of the
governance structure and dominated by the more radical forces (see Fig. 3).

Figure 3. The political economy of local governance: how external aid is channeled to foster
radicalization (SIG = Syrian Interim Government)
More important, donors did not coordinate their inputs into the opposition areas. Each donor
specified local governance guidelines within its own administrative procedures. (Half a dozen
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booklets detailing guidelines were circulated by the different donors.) No efforts were made to
develop territorial coordination of aid programs or infrastructure projects. Programs supported
either the local councils or the Syrian Interim Government and its institutions, including the
provincial council. Little was done to coordinate between the two levels or to create bottom-up
links to hold the upper-level governance structures accountable to the lower ones. For example,
the Syrian Interim Government and the provincial councils consistently describe the local councils
as “branch councils.” In that regard they seem to have replicated the attitude of the central
government in Damascus, which used access to central resources to impose its will over the lower
governance bodies. The situation is awkward at best because it allows every side to live and
propagate its narrative without having to face the reality of the situation or to develop a common
narrative. The donors believe they are funding good governance and humanitarianism, the Syrian
Interim Government believes it has branch governance bodies on the ground, and the armed groups
are able to submit to their nonstate radical donors that they are actually in charge of local
governance because they have local governance bodies that receive funds but do not have to be
branded as part of the Syrian Interim Government. Though some donors are changing direction
and paying more attention to the territorial dimension of aid,92 they are tending to focus on
provincial-level governance. They are not developing a link between the local and the provincial,
and they are not trying to mitigate middling levels of territoriality to help civilian actors offset the
armed groups’ decision-making power at that middling level between the local and the provincial
(refer back to Fig. 2).
The process of localization that took place with regard to the delivery of aid in governmentand Kurdish-controlled areas did not affect radicalization in the same manner. While civilian actors
continued to play a mitigating role in offsetting the armed actors in those areas, radicalization was
affected by other factors related more to ideology and identity politics.
Reshaping the Imagination: The Symbolic Structures of the Territory
As observed earlier, Syria as a territory has always been a place of contestation when it comes to
ideology and identity politics. The current war brought many of these contradictions to the surface
when the formal structure for imagining the state came under attack. Many Syrians believed that
they were immune to identity-based divisions, as evidenced by the early slogans of the uprising
declaring that the Syrian people are one and the counterslogans of the loyalists declaring that Syria
is protected by God and shall not be divided. Now, six years into the war, no Syrian faction will
accept talk about separation from the Syrian state. Almost all of the charters that were produced
through track two dialogues start with a statement that the participants agree about the territorial
integrity of the Syrian state and the unity of its people. Even the Kurds in Syria have always
insisted on their being part of the Syrian state. Though they want to see guarantees to protect their
rights as a minority in a majoritarian Arab country, and though they see those guarantees provided
only in a federal political system, they have never called for secession. Though the idea of unity is
well established, however, the Syrians agree on little else. The principle of equality before the law
is interpreted differently by the different stakeholders. The minorities often want groups’ rights,
the liberals want individual rights, and the groups speaking in the name of the Muslim Sunni
majority often speak about complementary rights between majority and minority groups. More
important, the history of pain and sorrow in Syria has many narratives. While those in the
opposition speak about the loss of freedoms under the Baath since 1963, many minorities recount
histories of pogroms perpetrated by the majority against their people that go back centuries.
Furthermore, the state failed in its education and cultural programming to forge unifying
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narratives. For the most part it was forbidden to talk in public about these grievances, which were
swept under the big rug of the Baath’s ideology of pan-Arabism.
While the rebellion did not start out as a sectarian cause, and many on the opposition side
came from minority religious and ethnic groups that may or may not have been secular, once the
uprising transformed into an armed conflict, Sunni Muslims made up the overwhelming majority
of the armed insurgents. Donors from the Gulf states provided abundant funding for armed groups
on condition of branding themselves with Sunni identity markers. Only in 2016 did some voices
in the opposition raise the question who stole the revolution?93 Some international observers had
pointed to the phenomenon early on,94 though the international debate in policy-making centers in
the West continued to play with the notion of the radical versus the moderate armed insurgents.
This article does not make any claims about who is radical and who is not, nor does it define the
phases of the radicalization of the rebellion.95 Instead it looks at how the radicalized ideologies of
all belligerents in the conflict have appropriated space and cultivated a new image of the Syrian
territory.
Leaving ISIS to the end, this section begins by examining how the Syrian government narrated
the conflict and represented the Syrian territory. The Baathist model of modernizing the Syrian
state made subtle use of sectarian politics and calibrated it periodically.96 The primary objective
of the Baathist policy was to achieve better control of the terrain and to counterbalance the different
communities to prevent any serious challenges to the system from within any particular sectarian
group. During the early years of the conflict, the formal discourse of the state often focused on the
national unity of the country. In interviews and public speeches the president spoke consistently
about the need to reconquer the whole of the Syrian land and to cleanse it of the terrorists. His
discourse permeated official media and private media loyal to the government in Damascus.
Beginning in the early days of the uprising, the official Syrian flag gained considerable prominence
over the Baath flag (perhaps to keep the opposition from raising the old Syrian flag that had been
used during the mandate period and into independence). Formal discussion of sectarian grievances
was prohibited in public media (despite the fact that a disproportionate number of Alawai army
men were killed in the fighting). The image of the state as a nonsectarian institution that respects
all beliefs was officially maintained.
As the morale of soldiers started to drop, however, and as the Alawi community began to feel
the burden of its young men dying in large numbers, informal manifestations of sectarianism
appeared. Sectarian narratives, symbols, and slogans became more prevalent. Also, as more and
more Shia militiamen were brought to Syria by the Iranian government to support Damascus in
asserting its control, sectarian slogans became increasingly loud, first in the battlefield and later in
the major cities in parades of fighters who had returned from battles. An esoteric ideology of death
and redemption started to emerge and with it the use of overt sectarian icons and amulets among
the fighters.97 The fighters developed different techniques to claim the public space and
demonstrate their increasingly radicalized religious zeal. Posters, parades, pictures of the martyrs,
and loud religious chants emanating from loudspeakers became common identity markers in many
cities, particularly in those such as Homs where the sectarian cleavage lines are predominant. In
the early days of the militarization of the conflict the government found it necessary to identify
specific neighborhoods and areas of the cities and designate them as sectarian-protected enclaves.
The flagging of sectarian symbolism, however, goes beyond the demarcation of turf to actually
asserting and demonstrating territorial control. The government also allowed all minorities, not
just the Alawi minority affiliated with the personal sect of the president, to establish their own
local militias. Christian-based militias were established in the predominantly Christian region of
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Wadi al-Nasara in the western part of the Homs governorate. Also, Sweidah Province was
encouraged to establish local Druze militias to protect its towns and villages. The hardening of the
sectarian front lines in response to the activities of the local militias created further social
fragmentation of the territory, making the central state in Damascus more of an arbiter among
communities and further reducing social capital in favor of a dependency on the state as the
territorial cement.
On the opposition side, many will be pressed to make strong disclaimers about the
Islamization of the territory. The phenomenon crept up on the secular activists.98 Yet, the
radicalization of the territory was manifest in symbolic and ideological terms from an early phase,
though the signs had to be carefully read within the language and discursive practices of jihadi
narratives. Again, this article does not attempt to define who is radical and who is moderate in the
armed opposition groups. The focus is on how the territory was appropriated by radical groups and
how their codes were imposed on the landscape to overshadow and sideline other possibilities for
imagining the terrain.
Ever since the dismantling of the khilafat in 1923, the Sunni Muslims have grappled with the
notion of governance and the legitimization of the state. While people such as Ali Abdulrazek
made early attempts to rationalize the principles of Islamic governance and legitimize any
sovereign who would uphold those principles, others, such as Rashid Rida, insisted that the khilafat
was the only legitimate form of governance, though with some qualification to meet quasidemocratic standards. Discourses on governance revolved between these two limits until some
activists in the late 1940s and early 1950s, feeling alienated from secular nationalism, started
promoting the idea that Muslims today are no longer living in Islamic states and that it is not
enough for the state to be predominantly Muslim to justify its inclusion in the Abode of Islam (dar
al-Islam).99 In a clear break from the previous practice of demarcating Muslim territory in moral
and physical geography and through social practice and the endowment of the terrain with social
meaning, the new jihadist ideologies focused on the Abode of Islam in aterritorial terms. The
identity markers of the Muslim territory are not geographical (related to specific sites) but
jurisprudential (related to where certain codes of conduct are upheld).100
Muslims living in lands not governed by Islamic principles might as well be living in the
Abode of Alienation (dar al-hijra) or the Abode of War (dar al-harb). The radical Salafi-Jihadist
discourses disagree on the obligation of Muslims to engage in transforming territories of alienation
and war to territories of Islam. Some advocate revolutionary and violent means and others advocate
coexistence with the rulers to advise them to make the transformation peacefully. Many started in
the first category and reverted to the second when they saw the futility of armed resistance.101 Yet,
most Salafi-Jihadist discourses today still believe in armed struggle as the only form of establishing
the Abode of Islam. Their inability to establish a clear terrain under the banner of an Islamic
khilafat prompted many to call for a decentralized process of jihad to carve enclaves where specific
Islamic principles and jurisprudence would demarcate the terrain of Islam rather than the
geographic presence of Muslim communities.102
Some of the essential principles that enable the demarcation of an Islamic territory involve the
institutions of the court and the public monitoring of rights and duties known as “hisba.”103 Other
instruments of governance, such as defense, public services, and foreign relations, were not
specifically defining markers for the Abode of Islam. In other words, the terrain’s physical
demarcation is of a lesser consequence than the principles ruling it. ISIS’s main slogan that the
Islamic State is lasting and expanding is emblematic of that principle. But as we have seen, the
religious authorities arbitrating among the armed groups insisted on retaining the functions of the
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courts and the oversight of the public good. Those were the only two aspects of the territorial
governance that were not relinquished to civilian LACs for fear of losing power and losing the
legitimizing role of those instruments within the jihadist discourse.
Ironically, in that respect, some the programs aimed at curbing the influence of extremism fell
right into the trap of reinforcing the symbolism of the jihadist territorial demarcation. A large part
of the USAID programs went to support law and order and reinforced policing as a distinct function
of local governance with the purpose of “preserving moderate space and deterring extremist
influence.” “Assistance,” the agency reports, “helps moderate actors remain relevant and maintain
moderate space, to resist extremists’ efforts to expand their influence by reaping the reputational
benefits of service delivery.”104 In an attempt to help stabilize governance in opposition-held areas,
the USAID provided substantial resources during the past two years to local police forces. Policing
is seen in traditional Muslim discourses as part of the hisba or maintenance of public oversight.
The US funding focused on the policing as such and did not look at its links to the religious
authorities and the symbolic meaning these links allow the authorities to attach to it. The early
attempts to set up independent judiciary functions by defected judges and opposition lawyers were
immediately met with harsh repression by the more radical groups.105
The strategy of most radical groups inside Syria was to maintain the symbolic elements of the
Islamic state even though they do not profess to impose such a state. This point applies to the
terrorist designated Al-Nusra front as well as to many of the other groups not classified as terrorists
but who profess similar radical inclinations. They were able to compromise on the outlook of their
turf by developing mechanisms for arbitrating their military powers and setting up the minimal
symbolic structures of statehood without claiming the territory and thus attracting attention to their
endeavors. They delegated services to civilian governance structures as long as these did not
infringe on the symbolic order of dar al-Islam (the Abode of Islam), as they espouse it to be. ISIS,
in contrast, decided to break the patterns and to move overtly to establish the full-fledged markers
of an Islamic state. This move should impose questions that have hitherto not been answered or
even asked.
The first of these questions is: What made ISIS break with the well-established norm in
jihadist circles of working to create the Abode of Islam from the bottom up? What made it take
the tremendous risk of surfacing and exposing itself to the whole world, knowing full well that the
international world order will not tolerate its territorial ambitions? The second of these questions
is: To what extent is ISIS truly invested in defending the territory? It was clear in its military tactics
that it was flexible about relinquishing certain terrain (even recently its most sacred terrain around
the town of Dabeq, where it believes that the battle for the end of the world will take place) while
it is still invested in conquering other terrain. Clearly this is not about turf as much as about battle
tactics. And the third question is: What sort of control does ISIS exercise on a moral ground beyond
its turf? This last question will determine how ISIS will metamorphose if and when it is defeated
militarily.
These questions will help determine how ISIS will eventually be confronted. To answer them
one must look at how ISIS defines its turf organizationally and, more important, morally and
ideologically. ISIS maintains two parallel and slightly contradictory territorial trends. On one hand,
it has fostered an image of a centralized power with strong local institutions working in tandem
with the directives of the central khilafat; on the other hand, it has fostered local forms of patronage
and diversified the models of alliance to the state, enabling it to exercise asymmetrical forms of
control despite its professed centrality.
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The centrality of ISIS as a state was constructed administratively through a form of provincial
governance similar to that of the Baath in which local governors are appointed and are accountable
to the center, and their actions and performance are closely monitored through a network of
informants.106 But on the symbolic level, the state was constructed by obliterating territorial
demarcations through the abolition of the Sykes–Picot era borders, the erasure of the provincial
boundaries, the destruction of local cultural markers and artifacts, the changing of toponyms, and
the implementation of absurd regulations whose sole purpose is to assert control.107 Even their
taxes were imposed, as we have seen, with an eye to establishing a certain social contract with
merchants and traders to abolish trade barriers.
Complementing ISIS’s efforts to foster the image of a centralized power are its efforts to foster
local patronage with tribal leaders and local elders. ISIS developed several forms of allegiance so
that tribal and other nonstate entities can bargain collectively on their form of adherence to the
khilafat through direct citizenship, protection and positive neutrality, and noninterference and
passive neutrality. A fourth form involves distant nominal allegiance to the state by nonadjoining
entities in other countries (some overt and some covert). With the ability to draw from a wide
arsenal of treaties derived from early Islamic models of political pacts signed by the prophet
Mohamed and the tribal leaders in Arabia, ISIS also had a much decentralized hold on its
immediate and its projected future terrains. ISIS was initially established as a series of aterritorial
networks.108 It continues to operate internally along that model despite its overt centralized
outlook. The geographical boundaries of the Islamic State as defined by ISIS are of little
consequence; they can expand and shrink and they can be exchanged and recaptured. In that regard
many of the attempts to defeat ISIS on a purely territorial level are missing the point about ISIS’s
symbolic markers of legitimacy.
This observation raises a further question: Why did ISIS choose to publicize the overt image
of the state when it could have operated as it did in Iraq for some time and as other groups operated
and are still operating in Syria without attracting much international attention to their radical
agendas in the quagmire of civil wars? One possible answer to that question (and there may be
many more) can be found in the theological debate over the foundation of a khilafat. Whereas a
terrain can be considered part of Abode of Islam on the simple condition that the courts are run
according to Islamic Sharia and the public order is maintained through the hisba institution, the
requirement for a formal khilafat has additional conditions, one of which pertains to having a
terrain for such a state to exist on. ISIS’s ability to establish the title of the khilafat and to endow
its leadership with a symbolic positioning that could give it a clear competitive edge over other
radical groups competing for allegiance and financial contributions from nonstate actors and
individuals around the world depended on its building up a terrain. Today, even after the allied
forces have destroyed much of ISIS’s capacity to produce oil, the revenue streams, diminished
though they may be, are still flowing and the basic financial infrastructure of ISIS has not been
destroyed. ISIS taps into important financial resources because it has created the moral competitive
edge with regard to other radical groups. It will likely continue to maintain that edge even when
the territory is eventually taken militarily by the formidable international alliance that has been
amassed despite all political differences on Syria. ISIS’s origin as an aterritorial network and the
funding infrastructure (established during its short-lived experiment with territoriality) are likely
to sustain its transformation and metamorphosis into the fifth generation of jihadists.
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Into the Future
The territorial transformation of the Syrian state, as we have seen, belies the simple colored map
of territorial control often portrayed in the international media. The fragmentation of the terrain
has manifested itself at different levels beyond the divided control zones of the principal
belligerents. We have seen also the internal fragmentation of the terrain controlled by each side
and, more important, the breakdown of economic flows and social capital across the terrain and
the rise of the militarized and radicalized actors as the only parties able to assert territorial
contiguity. International aid and the logistical concerns of humanitarianism have established
negative externality on the fragmentation of the terrain by being unable to mitigate the economic
and symbolic instruments of territorial control usurped by the armed and increasingly radicalized
actors.
While international stakeholders to the conflict have grappled with the question of who is to
blame and who is more radical and more moderate among the belligerents, they have turned a blind
eye to how the geography of the conflict was erasing social, economic, and symbolic layers of the
territorial order of Syria. While nothing is to be taken for granted with regard to this artificial order
developed over the century since the end of World War I, no viable alternatives were set to replace
it. With every act of erasure permitted by the war, the relative positioning of radicalized actors
improved. The uprising in Syria did not get stolen by the radical forces; the radical forces simply
managed the terrain more adeptly to usurp the very programs that were meant to undermine their
power.
This article does not propose a solution to the political conflict in Syria, nor does it attempt to
propose better models of demarcating the country’s territorial lines than those proposed by some
recent policy papers.109 Instead it proposes certain guidelines for the political solution to be taken
into consideration beyond the considerations of setting up a transitional governing body as
mandated by SC Res. 2254. That resolution seems to have become more and more elusive in the
light of recent developments in Syria. These guidelines are needed for the long haul and should be
incorporated into the political negotiations over the future of Syria and in the designation of funds
for stabilization and recovery. They include the following:
1. International stakeholders should put financial and political emphasis on bridging the
territorial divides imposed by the radical armed actors on all sides and helping the
civilian entities to establish their territorial networks to encourage economic flows,
complementary value chains, and positive social capital accumulation. At a
fundamental level the battle against radicalization cannot be won military; it has to be
won by tilting the micro balance of power away from the radical actors and encouraging
them to blend into the emerging territoriality rather than try to impede it.
2. Supporting the aggregation of local governance to provide stability and counteract the
influence of the radical actors cannot take place from the top down. It will have to take
place from the bottom up. Local governance should create a political space for
democracy to emerge. Top-down models will only foster the traditional political
economy based on the convenient relationship between the central power and the local
elite. This model has surfaced in Baathist territory and in ISIS areas, and when tried in
opposition areas it had the same outcome.
3. International donors should study not only the humanitarian and stability needs of local
communities but the negative externalities their funds may create when delivered in
socio-symbolic environments that are prone to radicalization. Beyond due diligence
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and standard do-no-harm reporting, donors should make a careful assessment of the
political economy of the receiving communities.
4. Syrians need to reimagine their state afresh. Their narratives of agony cannot be swept
under the rug to expedite the peace process. They will need to develop a new narrative
of living together and that narrative can be forged only if all agonies are recognized.
International stakeholders who supported one side of the conflict or the other need to
come to terms with the fact that they contributed directly to the fragmentation of the
country. Peace in Syria cannot be achieved without reconciliation and this requires that
a new moral territory be forged in the process.
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